The Aurora-Quezon-Nueva Ecija disaster - The disaster, a year on PDF Print
Tuesday, 29 November 2005
Article Index
The disaster, a year on
The Sponge Effect
Landslides and Rivers
Outrage, forest cover and people
Letting the river flow
Flooding and lives put at risk
Review strategy
Disaster coordination
Broader Water Agenda
Appendix

Flooding and lives put at risk

Given the pattern of tropical rainfall in the country, we will always have floods in certain areas. These seasonal flood lands are the natural geomorphology: broad shifting meanders in the valley floor, marshlands and mangroves. When we restrict the natural flows of these areas as flood lands, we too create disaster. The engineering of society to live away from the rivers and floodlands and maintaining this is a major feat and requires developing the infrastructure "in sympathy with" the river flood system.

The floods in Aurora and Quezon directly relate to what must be expected from torrential rains, not from ‘an act of God,' and the lack of land available most especially for the poor. If the plan is total safety, nobody should be living in Infanta, General Nakar, and Real. Infanta and General Nakar are towns on a major east coast delta, while Real is at the delta edge and next to steep slopes that suffered from slope failure and liquefaction that were washed into town by several streams. The spirit of people in Gabaldon in Nueva Ecija seemed equally hit, for all around the valley town the risk is everpresent. Every 10 years or so, events in the valley cause damage if not loss of life. When the Santor-Coronel River floods the waters rise from the south of Gabaldon. But when the floods hit this time the rains concentrated in the northern mountain streams and hit out in multiple directions across the alluvial area behind the town.

In the Philippines, it is not expected that everyone can be immediately and permanently relocated, so the effort must be gradual and strategic with a focus on reducing the highest risks. We have to address the proper relocation of people, primarily the poor who live in plywood and corrugated iron housing in flood lands. This was only partially done after the November 1991 Ormoc disaster. People still live today in the riverbed just upstream of the new flood dikes, wondering if the next flood will come in their lifetime. With proper attention and action given to this primary response of secure relocation of people and disaster awareness, then logging needs to be dealt with - seriously.

What all this calls for is a review of the comprehensiveness of our policy, the effectiveness of our implementation, and the commitment to help communities re-orient to a better understood reality, and so structure their impact on land use and settlements. Again, this reinforces the importance of local governments because they are the first actors on the scene. The real argument for action in the case of this disaster is the preparedness for such events and the relocation by government of people in high-risk areas. While we may be thankful for such deluges being so infrequent, waiting only to be caught off guard again can no longer be a tenable response. Much greater international focus needs to be given to this work.

Nationally, over the last few years there is increasing discussion and efforts to coordinate in building greater risk assessments for the whole country. The need to monitor heavy rains and not just typhoon winds has been a problem of resource availability and systems of communication. Reviewing existing levees, their maintenance and improvement, along with new sites needing development are critical and the necessary simultaneous social engagement to improve pre-, during, and post-disaster preparedness at the community and local government levels.



Last Updated ( Thursday, 06 January 2011 )